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Residential Peer Effects in Higher Education: 
Does the Field of Study Matter?
*
 
Economists have a poor understanding of the mechanisms underlying reduced-form college 
peer effects. In this paper we explore a candidate mechanism, the provision of school effort. 
We show that, when earnings reflect individual educational performance as well as the field 
of study selected at college, and individual effort is a function of expected earnings, the size 
of the peer effect varies by field. Using data from a middle-sized public university located in 
Southern Italy and exploiting the random assignment of first year students to college 
accommodation, we find evidence that peer effects are positive and statistically significant for 
students enrolled in the fields of Engineering, Maths and Natural Sciences – which are 
expected to generate higher earnings after college – and not different from zero for students 
enrolled in the Humanities, Social and Life Sciences, which give access to lower payoffs. An 
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 Introduction 
 
Understanding the nature and importance of peer group effects in education is crucial for 
education policy. One important question is whether the allocation of students to classes 
should mix or segregate abilities. The answer varies depending on the existence and non-
linearity of peer effects in the classroom (see Hoxby, 2000). Motivated by the relevance for 
policy, a small industry has developed which seeks to estimate the existence, size and non-
linearity of peer effects. Unfortunately, estimation is plagued by numerous problems, 
including the self-selection, reflection and correlated effects described by Manski, 1993.  
Following Sacerdote, 2001, and Zimmermann, 2003, a popular approach in this 
literature has been to investigate roommate peer effects, because in a number of 
universities and colleges the allocation of students to rooms can be argued to be 
conditionally random. The implied orthogonality of peer abilities with respect to omitted 
confounders and the use of a reduced-form equation to overcome the reflection problem 
allows to identify peer effects, thereby by-passing some of the thorny econometric issues 
indicated above. Successful identification, however, comes at a price. The empirical 
evidence in favour of roommate peer effects is limited: many studies find small or no 
effects, which vary in relation to the sample used (for an assessment of the empirical 
literature see Foster, 2006; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006).  
Even if reduced – form peer effects can be proven to exist, one wonders about the 
economic and social mechanisms generating them. As remarked by Foster, 2006, 
“..economists have an under-developed understanding of the processes likely to underlie 
reduced – form peer effects”. In this paper, we explore the provision of school effort as a 
candidate economic mechanism which affects the size of peer effects. If labour market 
earnings reflect individual educational performance as well as the field of study selected at 
college, optimal effort chosen by students varies by field in response to expected earnings 
differences, even when the cost of effort and the technology regulating school performance 
are homogeneous across fields. While peer ability affects both the marginal costs and the 
marginal benefits of school effort, the intensity of the effect on the latter – and on school 
performance - crucially depends on the field specific expected returns to successful college 
education.    3
This economic mechanism has the interesting implication that the size of the peer 
effect is not invariant to labour market shocks affecting the college wage premium in 
different fields of study. To illustrate, an expected demand shift which increases the 
demand for engineers and their relative earnings – compared to other fields of study – 
should increase optimal effort and hence the peer effect among students enrolled in 
Engineering, even though the technology of production of human capital and the cost of 
effort while at school is invariant across fields. 
We submit the hypothesis that the size of exogenous peer effects vary with the field of 
study to empirical scrutiny, using data on residential roommates at a middle – sized Italian 
University. We start by showing that college wages in Italy are significantly affected by 
individual college performance and field of study. Next, we document that the allocation of 
students to rooms in the residential halls of the selected university is conditionally random. 
Finally, we estimate reduced – form linear peer effect models, as in most of the empirical 
literature, and find evidence that the size of the roommate peer effect varies significantly 
with the field of study and is higher in the fields in which students expect higher wage 
premia.  
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of the empirical 
literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model and presents empirical evidence on 
the relationship between the field of study and college earnings. Section 4 describes the 
data and the assignment mechanism of students to rooms in the residential halls. Section 5 
shows our empirical results. Conclusions follow.  
 
1.  Review of the Empirical Literature  
 
  Most empirical studies which investigate peer group effects at college exploit the 
presence of a mechanism which randomly assigns students to rooms and peers. This 
literature has focused mainly on the residential peer group effects involving roommates, 
relying on a housing assignment process that allocates each student to a roommate 
exogenously. Results are far from being conclusive: many studies find small or no peer 
effects and the significance and size of peer effects often changes in relation to the sample 
used.   4
  Sacerdote, 2001, finds weak evidence of peer effects when roommate 
characteristics are entered linearly, but significant and positive effects when non-linearities 
are introduced. Zimmerman, 2003, finds that students in the middle 70% of the SAT 
distribution perform worse when they have a roommate in the bottom 15%. These effects 
are present for males but not for females. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006, 
differently from the previous two studies – which use data from very selective US colleges 
– consider a sample of more heterogeneous students from Berea College. They find 
positive peer effects (limited to females) when peer quality is measured with high school 
grades, but no effect when alternative measures of  peer ability are adopted.  
In a similar vein Kremer and Levy, 2003 find no effect of the roommate academic 
background on student performance, but show that pre-college drinking habits among male 
students tend to negatively influence their roommates’ GPA, especially among lower-
performing students. Foster, 2006, considers students from the University of Maryland and 
finds no peer effects for women, and only modest peer effects for men. In addition, she 
shows that friends do not impact on individual school performance more than randomly 
selected peers. Finally, Winston and Zimmermann, 2003, use data on three schools from 
the College and Beyond database and find evidence of statistically significant and positive 
peer effects, at least for one of the schools considered
1.  
 
3. Optimal Educational Effort, Peer Effects and the Field of Study 
 
We start this section by introducing a simple theoretical model of student effort choice 
in the presence of peer effects, which shows how these effects can vary with the field of  
study. Next we present some empirical evidence in support of the view that labour market 
earnings vary significantly with the field of study, as well as with individual college 
performance. 
 
3.1 The Model 
                                                      
1 A recent contribution to this literature, which uses Italian data, is De Giorgi, Pellizzari and 
Radaelli, 2006. These authors use random assignment to teaching classes as identification 
strategy and estimate peer effects on the choice of the field of study.  
   5
 
Assume that students use the same technology for the production of college 
performance, and also share the same cost of effort function. They differ however in their 
personal characteristics, such as ability, in the ability of their peer and in the field of study 
they engage in. Define individual performance at college of student i as  i y  and assume that 
it is a linear function of individual (pre-determined) ability  i q , effort  i e , roommate ability 
j q  and the educational resources in the selected field F (which include teacher quality, the 
availability and quality of labs, etc.): 
 
i j i i i F q q e y ε η δ γ λ + + + + =        [ 1 ]  
 
The linear specification simplifies the algebra without affecting the key results, and 
is also consistent with the empirical specification adopted in most of the literature. While 
ability is exogenously given, effort is subject to individual choice. In order to pass 
examinations, a student needs to perform above or at the standard s . Conditional on 
individual and peer ability, the higher the standard, the higher the effort required to meet 
the standard (see Costrell, 1994). Passing rather than failing exams depends also on a 
random event ε  (luck), which we assume to have a standard normal distribution 
) 1 , 0 ( N ≈ ε . 
Using Φ for the normal distribution function, the individual probability of passing 
the standard is: 
 
( ) ( ) F q q e s s y P j i i f f i i η δ γ λ − − − − Φ − == ≥ = 1 Pr         [2] 
 
Higher expected performance at school yields higher expected labour market returns, 
which differ also across fields, possibly reflecting variations in relative demand and 
supply. The expected wage w of individual i graduating in field  f  is:  
 
() i f if y E w α =        [ 3 ]  
 
where the multiplicative formulation is consistent with the log-linear Mincerian equations   6
estimated in the empirical literature
2. In the event of failure to pass exams and graduate, 
labour market returns are normalized to zero.  
Assuming risk neutrality, individual expected utility is increasing in the expected 
benefits of higher effort and decreasing in the costs of effort. Higher effort increases both 
college performance and the probability of passing the exams and graduate. We model the 
cost of effort as a quadratic function  
 
i j i i
i
j i i e zq e xq
e
q q e C − − =
2
) , , (
2 ψ
      [4] 
 
where we allow individual and peer ability to reduce the cost of effort.  
Expected utility is 
 
() i j i i
i
i f i i e zq e xq
e
y E P U + + − =
2
2 ψ
α                   [5] 
 
Rational students choose effort to maximize utility. The first order condition for a 
maximum is  
 
( ) () 0 . = + + − + + + + j i i j i i f f i zq xq e F q q e P ψ λφ η δ γ λ α λ α  [6] 
 
where  () . φ  is the density function of the error term ε . 
In order to study how individual effort varies when peer ability is marginally 
increased, it is useful to adopt the following first order Taylor approximations of the 
normal distribution and density functions around their mean 
 
() ( ) F q q e s j i i f η δ γ λ φ − − − − + = Φ 0
2
1
   [7] 
) 0 ( φ φ =     
                                                      
2 The implicit assumption here is that students know the wage function associating performance to earnings 
and form their expectations from realizations, a standard assumption in this literature. See the discussion in 
Brunello, Lucifora and Winter Ebmer, 2004.    7
 
Using [7] in [6] we can re-write the first order condition as follows: 
 
() () ( ) () 0 0 0
2
1





⎛ − − − − − j i i j i i f f j i i f zq xq e F q q e F q q e s ψ λφ η δ γ λ α λ α η δ γ λ φ
 
where the second order conditions require that  () 0 0 2 2 > − = Δ φ λ α ψ f f . Solving for 
optimal individual effort we obtain: 
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μ .  
 Peer  ability  j q  positively affects individual effort by reducing its marginal cost and 
by increasing its marginal benefit. Since the marginal benefit of effort is increasing in the 
(expected) labour market return  f α  , the size of the peer effect on effort – and consequently 
on school performance - is larger in the fields that are expected to generate a higher monetary 
payoff after graduation.  
Replacing [8] into [1] yields: 
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The reduced-form equation [9] shows that individual performance at college is affected by 














f z 0 2
1
2φ λ α
δ  depends both on the parameters of the common technology 
and cost of effort functions and on the field specific (conditional) wage premium  f α :
3 the 
                                                      
3 Notice that denominator  f Δ  is decreasing in  f α .   8
higher the premium the stronger the incentive to pass the threshold and graduate, and the 
higher the effort and the contribution of the peer effect to effort. The model produces two 
empirical testable implications: first, the size of the peer effect should be larger in fields 
where the labour market payoff is higher; second, a similar relationship should hold for 
own ability.  
 
3.2. College Earnings, Academic Performance and the Field of Study 
 
In previous sub-section we have postulated that individual earnings after college 
depend on the field of study and are an increasing function of individual performance. We 
submit this hypothesis to empirical scrutiny by using the 2001 wave of the Survey of 
college graduates in Italy (ISTAT, “Indagine statistica sull’inserimento professionale dei 
laureati”), which contains information on earnings three years after graduation and allows 
us to control both for the field of study and for individual performance at college. 
Following Brunello and Cappellari, 2007, we regress log net monthly wages on 
individual performance, measured by the final graduation marks, two dummies for the field 
of study (the scientific group, which includes Maths, Sciences and Engineering, and the 
group including the Humanities and Social Sciences, while the remaining fields, including  
Life Sciences, are in the constant term) and the following vector of observables: gender, 
college attended, region of employment, labour market experience and type of job, parental 
background in terms of occupation and education, year of birth, the number of siblings, the 
duration of college studies, the type of high school attended (whether generalist or 
technical/professional) and the marks reported in the high school graduation exam. We 
also include interactions between parental education and occupation, on the one hand, and 
marks and school types, on the other.  
In estimating the wage equation we make the assumption that, conditional on the 
observables, there is no selection into college and faculty according to students unobserved 
ability, so that the coefficients can be consistently estimated. Clearly, the validity of such 
assumption depends on how well we control for factors that are related to individual ability 
and that may influence college choice. While there is no guarantee that our assumption is 
going to be met, we stress  that the vector of observables consists of a detailed list of 
control factors, including interactions, which leads us to believe that omitted variables bias   9
– if existent – is  mild.  
Table 1 presents the results of the wage equation and shows that log earnings are 
significantly affected by the final graduation marks: evaluated at the sample means, we 
find that a 10 percent  increase in the final marks yields a 2.77 percent increase in net 
monthly earnings three years after graduation. We also find that graduating in a scientific 
field yields a 8.2 percent earnings premium with respect to graduating in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences, and a 10.4 percent premium with respect to other fields such as 
Medicine
4. This evidence suggests that – ceteris paribus – we should expect a larger 
roommate peer effect among students enrolled in scientific fields such as Engineering and 
Maths and Sciences. 
 
Table 1. The Impact of Graduation Marks and the Field of Study on Earnings.  
Dependent Variable: log net monthly earnings 
   
Graduation marks  0.003 
(4.85)*** 
Scientific Field Dummy  0.104 
(10.07)*** 
Humanities and Social Sciences Dummy  0.022 
(2.29)** 
   
R-squared  0.38 
   
Observations  10455 
Notes: the data are from ISTAT (2001). t-statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, *  indicate that the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level of confidence respectively. The regression includes the following vector of observables: 
gender, college attended, region of employment, labour market experience and type of job, parental background in terms of occupation 
and education, year of birth, the number of siblings, the duration of college studies, the type of high school attended (whether generalist 
or technical/professional), the marks reported in the high school graduation exam, interactions between parental education and 
occupation and marks and school types.  
 
 
4. Data and the Assignment of Students to Rooms  
 
We use administrative data covering students who live on campus at the University 
of Calabria. The University of Calabria is a middle-sized public university located in the 
South of Italy, which currently enrols about 33,000 students in six fields of study 
(Economics, Pharmacy and Nutritional Sciences, Engineering, Humanities, Math and 
Sciences and Political Science),
5 and was ranked second in the 2004 list of Italian public 
                                                      
4 Both premia are significantly different from zero at the 1% level of confidence. 
5 After the 2001 reform, the Italian universities offer both first level degrees, lasting three years, and more 
advanced  degrees, lasting two years.   10
universities of similar size for the relative quality of its services, infrastructures, 
computerization and financial support to students
6. The University of Calabria offers 
accommodation to nearly 2100 entitled students - close to one  fifth of them are freshmen 
(on average 460 each year). There are 12 residence halls (blocks), divided in flats and 
rooms. Six of these halls are located on campus and the remaining six are outside campus, 
at a distance of 3 to 6 kilometres.  
Our data on the cohorts of students enrolled from 2000-2001 to 2006-2007 are 
drawn from the University Residential Office’s records and from the administrative files of  
student exams, and include information both on individual background characteristics and 
on academic outcomes – in terms of passed exams and grades obtained in each exam. 
Individual background characteristics include gender, the type of High School attended, 
the High School Final Grade, the province of residence and parental economic conditions, 
captured by a synthetic administrative indicator called ISEE, which takes into account 
household income and wealth, and the number of household components. To be admitted 
in the halls of residence, a student must meet some requirement in terms of value of ISEE 
and place of residence
 7 . Conditional on admission, we have information on housing 
assignment – the hall, the flat and the room.  
As in most of the empirical literature, we restrict our attention to incoming 
freshmen, for whom we are confident that residence assignment is conditionally random
8. 
The assignment mechanism is as follows: first, students applying for University residence 
are ranked by the Residential Office according to their economic conditions – measured by 
ISEE; second, residential places are assigned sequentially, starting with the students at the 
top of the list, that is, those with a lower value of ISEE. Students can only choose the 
residence hall. Conditional on the choice of the hall and on the presence of vacancies, flats 
and rooms are assigned by the Residential Office depending on availability
9.  
Differently from the American colleges studied in the literature (see Sacerdote, 
2001, and Zimmermann, 2003, among others), applicants are not required to fill any 
                                                      
6 See the ranking at http://www.repubblica.it/speciale/2004/censis/classifiche/mediatenei.html 
7 Notice that students living in the area near the University – who reside in towns located at approximately 
less than 40 km from college – cannot apply for accommodation, independently of their income. 
8 Older students can try to change the roommate to live with, depending on availability. 
9 More in detail, the eligible student is asked by the personnel of the Residential Office to choose one among 
the available halls of residence in the University Campus. If a vacancy is available in the selected hall, the 
student is assigned. If there is no vacancy, the student is prompted to select another hall, and the iteration 
continues until convergence. Clearly, students coming first have greater choice.   11
housing questionnaire. Therefore, places in rooms and flats are assigned to students of the 
same gender independently of personal preferences for smoking, music and else. 
Furthermore, a freshman can be assigned both to other freshmen and to senior students.  
Since students are assigned sequentially to rooms according to their economic 
conditions, a potential outcome of the assignment process might be that students end up in 
pairs or groups characterized by similar economic conditions and by similar academic 
ability, which could happen if the latter is strongly correlated with the former. This risk 
appears to be negligible in our data for two reasons: first, about 57% of freshmen end up 
with senior roommates, who could have changed rooms after their initial allocation as 
freshmen; second, even if students have very similar “formal” economic conditions, their 
real economic conditions may be quite different, due to the endemic understatement of 
income and wealth in the South of Italy. While the indicator of economic conditions used 
by the Residential Office ranged between 0 to about 13.000 euros in 2006, these very low 
values might have resulted from the fact that a substantial part of household income is 
earned in the underground economy and not reported
10.  
We identify the peer with the roommate. Whether this is the peer of “potential 
influence” is obviously an open question, as discussed in detail by Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2006. It is certainly the definition used by the bulk of previous empirical 
research. Since the emphasis of this paper is on the interaction between peer effects and 
field of study, we prefer to adopt a definition of peers already implemented in the 
literature
11.  
Our initial sample consists of 2687 freshmen with a residential place at the 
University Campus from year 2000 to 2006. After dropping 675 observations 
corresponding to individuals assigned to single rooms and 589 additional observations 
because of missing values in one or more relevant variables, we end up with a final sample 
of 1423 first year students - 1193 assigned to a double room, 217 to a triple room and 13 to 
quads. Our measure of student performance at college, or GPA, is the average grade earned 
in the exams passed during the first year at college. Since courses vary in their difficulty, 
we weight each grade with the number of credits assigned to the course. The variable GPA 
ranges between 18 – the minimum passing line – and 30.  
                                                      
10 According to the National Statistical Institute, irregular labour in Calabria covers 31 percent of total labour, 
compared to a national average of 13.4. See ISTAT, 2004. 
11 We also experiment with an alternative definition of peer, the flatmate, but with no significant results.   12
In this literature, pre-determined academic ability is based on the results of 
standardized test scores, such as the SAT for the US. No such test is available in Italy 
before college entry. Furthermore, compared to the US, where secondary school is 
comprehensive, Italian students are tracked fairly early – at age 14 – into general and 
vocational tracks. Even though the final exit exam is national, the contents of the exam 
vary according to the type of secondary school. Tracking introduces important 
heterogeneity in the final grade attained at the time of high school graduation.  
In order to  mitigate this problem, we use the outcomes of international cognitive 
tests - taken at age 15 and recently carried out by the OECD under the PISA project - as 
measures of the quality of secondary schools. We extract our measure of individual 
academic ability – which we call ACA for brevity – from a principal component analysis 
which includes two factors, the marks at graduation from secondary school and the 
standardized average test score for each type of high school – which covers maths, reading, 
science and problem solving – from PISA 2003 (see OECD, 2004). Since most of the 
students enrolling at the University of Calabria are from the South of Italy, we use the 
standardized PISA test scores for this part of the country
12.  
Peer ability is the roommate’s ability in the case of a double room, and the simple 
average of roommates’ ability in the case of triple and larger rooms
13. Table 2 shows the 
descriptive statistics for our sample of students. Own and peer academic ability ranges 
between 69.23 to 100. Average ACA is at 88.65, higher in the more demanding general 
track (Lyceum) than in the vocational track; average GPA is slightly above 24, highest in 
the Humanities and lowest in Engineering. The distribution of students across fields is not 
even, with 26% enrolled in the Faculty of Economics, 8% in the Faculty of Pharmacy and 
Nutritional Sciences, 19% in Engineering, 27% in the Humanities, 9% in Mathematics and 
Natural Sciences and 8% in the Faculty of  Political Science. 
To confirm the randomness of the assignment mechanism of students to residential 
halls, we follow the empirical literature and regress individual ability ACA on the peer’s 
ACA and additional controls, which include a gender dummy, cohort and halls of residence 
effects. If entering students are sorted into rooms by ability, then the coefficient attracted 
by the peer’s ACA should be positive and statistically significant.  
                                                      
12 Bratti, Checchi and Filippin, 2007, present evidence on the territorial differences in PISA test scores across 
the North and the South of Italy. 
13 Peers can be freshmen, sophomores or senior students.   13
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean Std  Dev  Min.  Max.  Obs. 
       
Female  0.681   0  1 1423 
ACA average  88.652 6.78  69.23  100  1423 
ACA Lyceum   94.125 4.65  69.23 94.25  943 
ACA Technical/vocational  85.172 5.51  79.14  100  480 
       
 GPA average  24.078 2.78  18  30  1423 
GPA Economics  23.381 2.41  18  30  379 
GPA Pharmacy and Nutritional Sciences  22.756 2.45  18  30  117 
GPA Engineering  22.508 2.63  18  30  272 
GPA Humanities  26.070 2.12  18  30  392 
GPA Mathematics and Natural Sciences  23.764 2.50  18  30  124 
GPA Political Science  24.824 2.73  18  30  139 
       
 
Table 3 presents the results of this regression for the full sample and for two sub-
samples, one including the faculties of Engineering and Mathematics and the other 
including the remaining four faculties in the University. It turns out that in no case we fail 
to reject the hypothesis that the conditional correlation between individual and peer ability 
is not statistically significant. Therefore we conclude that the allocation of freshmen to 
rooms is conditionally random. 
 
 
Table 3. Endogeneity checks. Dependent Variable: Individual Academic Ability (ACA) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      






      
Gender Dummy  YES YES  YES 
Cohort Dummies  YES YES  YES 
Halls Dummies  YES YES  YES 
      
R-squared  0.03 0.15  0.05 
Observations  1423 396  1027 
      
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, *  indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level of confidence respectively.  
 
 
5. The Empirical Findings 
Our empirical specification is based on Eq. (9), and is similar to the traditional 
empirical approach implemented for instance by Zimmerman (2003) and Sacerdote (2001).   14
We estimate  
 
i i f j f i f f i X ACA ACA c GPA ν β β β + + + + = 3 2 1     [ 1 0 ]  
 
where X is a vector of controls, which include cohort, gender and residence dummies. By 
including these dummies we intend to control for the correlated un-observables problem, 
which arises if there is some group – specific component in the error term (see Soetevent, 
2006). Notice that we explicitly allow the estimated coefficients to vary with the field of 
study, in line with the theoretical model. If roommates are allocated randomly, the OLS 
estimate of peer effects is consistent even in the presence of omitted variables which affect 
GPA (Sacerdote, 2001). 
Table 4 presents the results for the six faculties of the University. There is evidence 
that individual academic performance has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
individual GPA at college. In the Humanities, Social and Life sciences the estimated 
coefficient associated to the peer’s academic ability is either negative or close to zero, but 
never statistically significant. On the other hand, the same coefficient is positive but still 
rather imprecisely estimated in Engineering, Mathematics and Natural Sciences.  
 
Table 4. Estimates of Peer Effects (Reduced form) by Field of Study. Dependent Variable: 
Individual GPA 







Engineering Mathematics   
and Natural 
Sciences 
























        












        
Halls Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Cohort Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations  379 117 392 139 272 124 
R Squared  0.24 0.26 0.21 0.36 0.34 0.53 
        
Note: see Table 3 
Table 5 presents our findings when we pool all faculties together and include in the 
regression faculty specific fixed effects. Since the pattern of results in Table 4 suggests that 
the former four faculties and the latter two faculties are relatively homogeneous as far as   15
peer effects are concerned, we also present the results of a specification that pools all fields 
of study together but allows the coefficients associated to both academic ability and the 
residential, gender and cohort dummies to vary between the two groups. This is done by 
interacting these variables with the dummy SCI, which is equal to 1 for the fields of 
Engineering, Maths and Natural Sciences and to 0 otherwise. 
The key finding of the table – in line with our theoretical model and with equation 
[9] – is that both own academic ability and peer academic effects are significantly larger in 
the sub-group of scientific faculties (SCI=1) than in the sub-group of Humanities, Social 
and Life Sciences (SCI=0). In the sub-group of Engineering, Maths and Natural Sciences, 
the effects of own and peer academic ability are equal to 0.204 (t-statistic: 13.04) and to 
0.038 (t-statistic:2.37) respectively.  
 
 
Table 5. Estimates of Peer Effects (Reduced form): full sample with and without 
interactions. Dependent Variable: Individual GPA. 
 (1)  (2) 
    








ACA * SCI   0.053 
(2.79)*** 
ACA Roommate * SCI   0.055 
(2.84)*** 
    




Halls Dummies  YES YES 
Cohort Dummies  YES YES 
Faculty Dummies  YES YES 
Female * SCI  NO -0.256 
(0.85) 
Halls Dummies * SCI  NO YES 
Cohort Dummies * SCI  NO YES 
    
R-squared  0.41 0.43 
Observations  1423 1423 
    
Note: see Table 3.  
 
 
How large is the roommate peer effect in the scientific faculties compared to the 
effects found in the empirical literature? If we take the ratio of the coefficient of the 
roommate’s ACA to the coefficient of the own ACA, we find that it is equal to 0.212 in the   16
scientific faculties, which compares to 0.042 in Zimmermann (2003), to the range 0.098 to 
0.172 in Winston and Zimmerman and to the range 0.073 to 0.193 in Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2006). We conclude that, when measured as a percentage of the own 
background ability effect, the roommate peer effect detected in our study for the sub-group 
of scientific faculties is not small. 
Our theoretical model in Section 3 suggests that differences in the expected returns 
to college are sufficient to generate variations in the size of own and peer contextual 
effects, even when the human capital technology and the cost of effort function is the same 
across students enrolled in different fields. Our evidence on the returns to college shows 
that graduates in the scientific fields earn – ceteris paribus – higher labour market returns. 
The evidence in Table 5 corroborates the implications of our model by showing that the 
size of the own and peer academic effect is larger in the faculties that offer higher expected 
wage premia.  
Our findings have interesting implications on the complex economic mechanism 
underlying peer effects. Suppose that the economy is hit by asymmetric shocks, that shift 
the  composition of the demand for graduate labour away from economists and towards 
engineers. These shocks not only are likely to alter expected returns by increasing the wage 
premium paid to engineers,  but they can also affect the size of peer effects at college, 






The existing literature on peer effects in higher education has produced mixed 
evidence at best. Particularly detrimental to an adequate understanding of the phenomenon 
– which has many relevant policy implications – is that the economic and social 
mechanisms producing peer effects are far from clear.  
Using administrative data from University of Calabria, a middle-sized public 
University in Southern Italy, we have investigated whether roommate peer effects vary 
significantly with the field of study. We have exploited the random assignment of first year 
students to college accommodation and found evidence that peer effects are positive and   17
statistically significant for students enrolled in Engineering, Maths and Natural Sciences, 
and not different from zero for students enrolled in the Humanities, Social and Life 
Sciences. The size of the peer effect for scientific faculties is rather large, compared to 
other studies in the literature. 
We have presented a simple theoretical model which suggests that the uncovered  differences 
between fields in the size of the peer effect are generated by the between – fields variation of 
labour market returns, which affect optimal student effort. Peer ability positively affects individual 
effort by reducing its marginal cost and by increasing its marginal benefit. Since the marginal 
benefit of effort is increasing in the expected labour market returns, the size of the peer effect on 
effort – and consequently on school performance - is larger in the fields that are expected to 
generate a higher monetary payoff after graduation.    
The economic mechanism at play has the interesting implication that the size of the 
peer effect is not invariant to shocks affecting the college wage premium in different fields 
of study. Therefore, a demand shift which increases the demand for engineers and their 
relative earnings – compared to other fields of study – is expected to increase the peer 
effect in the field of Engineering, even though the technology of production of human 
capital and the cost of effort while at school is invariant across fields. 
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